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Constructions of parents in ACEs discourse 
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Abstract 
In December 2017, the House of Commons Parliamentary Science and Technology Committee put out a 
call for submissions to an Inquiry which would consider the evidence-base for early intervention policies, 
with a particular focus on µAdverse Childhood Experiences¶ or ACEs. This paper analyses those 
submissions and the transcripts of the Inquiry¶s oral sessions in the belief that they constitute a useful 
window through which to explore the types of claims being made in ACEs discourse. Our aim is to assess 
whether the ACEs phenomenon represents a continuity with what has been termed the µfirst three years 
movement¶ (Thornton, 2011a and b): social policy and philanthropic activism which focuses on the earliest 
years of life in the name of preventing social problems µdown the line¶. In particular, we consider 
constructions of parents as determinate of these social problems through their influence on their children 
and the ways in which these are gendered in new ways. 
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Background 
In December 2017, the House of Commons Parliamentary Science and Technology Committee put out a 
call for submissions to an µEvidence-Based Early Years Intervention¶ Inquiry which would consider: 
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...current research into µadverse childhood experiences, the extent of the evidence linking them to 
negative outcomes in later life and relevant educational, social and health interventions, as well as 
the extent to which this research is supported and used by Government.1 
 
This paper analyses those submissions and the transcripts of the Inquiry¶s two oral sessions in the belief 
that they constitute a useful window through which to explore the types of claims being made in ACEs 
discourse. Our aim is to assess the extent to which the ACEs phenomenon represents a continuity with 
what has been termed the µfirst three years movement¶ (Thornton, 2011a and b): social policy and 
philanthropic activism which focuses on the earliest years of life in the name of preventing social problems 
µdown the line¶. A particularly striking feature of the first three years movement has been the description of 
parents as both the cause of, and solution to, these social problems. The Inquiry evidence provides an 
opportunity to examine some of the tensions within this construction. 
 
One hundred and ten documents were submitted by a range of organisations and individuals. They were 
most numerous from the charitable sector (32), with high numbers also submitted by university departments 
(22, mostly psychology, epidemiology, public health) and individuals (22, most described themselves as 
psychologists, but this group also included MPs, parents and advocates for particular causes). Government 
departments also made contributions, as did some local authorities and health service providers (15). 
Another notable group was constituted of professional bodies (10) such as the Association of Directors of 
Public Health, the Royal College of Paediatricians, the British Psychological Society and the Institute of 
Health Visiting. Intervention programme providers (6, including Triple P and Roots of Empathy) also 
submitted, as did two quasi-govermental organisational bodies (The Big Lottery and Manchester Child and 
Parents Service) and one think tank (the Centre for Social Justice).  
 
A small number of submissions were highly critical of the ACEs concept and the development of policies 
based upon it. We were the co-authors of one such submission2, in which we expressed our concern that 
the stated aim of the Committee to µexamine the strength of the evidence linking adverse childhood 
experiences with long-term negative outcomes¶3 may have been compromised by a presumption, evident 
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in the committee chairman¶s video request for submissions, that µwe now know¶ the µtruth¶ about the benefits 
of the ACEs framework. This, we argued, risked prematurely narrowing the Inquiry¶s purpose to that of 
amassing evidence of µwhat works¶ in implementing the ACEs approach, rather than interrogating whether 
ACEs is a useful way of addressing social problems. We positioned our submission as a µsocial science 
critique¶ rooted in a critical engagement with the conceptualisations of children, families and society which 
have underpinned µearly intervention¶ since the mid-1990s.  
The µsocial science critique¶ 
A novel feature of the first three years movement has been a narrow conceptualisation of social problems 
which effaces complexity and material factors. In our submission, we questioned the way in which early 
intervention and ACEs advocates tend towards an almost evangelical embrace of µnew solutions¶ and 
µmagic bullets¶ to complex and longstanding social problems, arguing that the history of social policy 
suggests that there are unlikely to be µmagic bullet¶ interventions which work rapidly and universally. We 
also argued that the movement has taken structural questions off the agenda, thus offering as µsolutions¶ 
only individualised, µpreventive¶ behaviour change or retrospective therapeutic interventions.  
 
Although the first three years movement relies on scientised metaphors to lend authority to its claims to 
truth, criticisms of the scientific evidence base do not necessarily dent the confidence of its advocates 
(Macvarish, 2016). That the ACEs approach has already been rolled out through government institutions 
and state service providers prior to the parliamentary Inquiry suggests that despite claims that this is 
evidence-based policy, a belief in early years determinism - the µfirst years last forever¶ - exists prior to, and 
often in spite of, scientific and other research: hence the description of the first three years movement as a 
social cause µin search of an argument¶ (Lee et al 2014b). 
 
The Inquiry called for submissions to address the µopportunities, risks and challenges¶ of the ACEs 
approach. Our contribution raised the possible risks of cultivating a view which sees people as wholly 
determined by their past experiences, asking whether this is a helpful solution to current difficulties, whether 
at an individual or a societal level. A familiar trope of much policy advocacy is a tendency to exaggerate the 
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scale of a social problem, in the case of ACES, in claims that almost half the population (47% in England, 
50% in Wales, according to some) experiences at least one ACE. We argued that growing the problem in 
order to strengthen the case for policy attention and state-funding risks blurring the boundaries between 
normal and abnormal experiences, pathologising a very large proportion of the population and undermining 
the possibility of meeting the specific needs of people with serious problems. 
 
The µfirst three years movement¶ 
From the late nineteenth century onwards a succession of social movements sought to secure familial and 
social progress through improving maternal behaviour (Apple, 2006; Hendrick, 1997). In 1998, the 
renowned developmental psychologist Jerome Kagan drew attention to the µseductive allure¶ of infant 
determinism evident in a new strand of late twentieth century US policy-making, which resurrected earlier 
preoccupations with improving the quality of mothering. The following year, Professor John T. Bruer 
questioned the way in which this agenda was being constructed around highly fatalistic claims about infant 
brain development. The rearticulation of parental responsibility around the cultivation of the infant brain has 
since become disseminated to Canada and South America, Northern Europe and increasingly, globally, 
through international agencies (Broer and Pickersgill, 2015; Edwards et al 2015; Macvarish, 2016; Martin, 
2015; White and Wastell, 2015).  
 
Sociologist Frank Furedi used the concept µparental determinism¶ to connote this intensive focus on parental 
behaviour and in particular, on parental failure. Furedi writes of parents being assigned the new identity of 
µflawed gods¶: determinate of their child¶s future but destined to fail in the task (2001). Parents, it is argued, 
are thus centred as the primary µrisk factor¶ determining the infant¶s future, but are simultaneously de-
throned because they are cast as requiring professional support to render them µsafe¶ (Macvarish et al, 
2015). The ACEs phenomenon seems to represent a continuation of these policy developments in that the 
way children are raised by their parents is located as the key cause of social problems and claims to truth 
are highly biologised. In what follows, we explore the way in which parents are positioned in the 





Identifying µthe problem¶ and its cause 
The documents were analysed in two stages using MAXQDA qualitative data analysis software. First, 
searches were run across the sample to determine the types of µproblems¶ being raised. In our sample, the 
most commonly mentioned problems were µmental health¶ (915 references) and µabuse¶ (834 references), 
both were referred to over three times as often as µhousing¶ and over ten times as often as µunemployment¶, 
indicating that the household and intimate relations were favoured for concern over material factors. 
Adverse Childhood Experiences are typically listed as sexual abuse; physical abuse; verbal abuse; 
domestic violence; parental separation; mental illness; alcohol abuse; drug abuse and parental 
incarceration, tending to locate µthe problem¶ and its cause within parent-child relaionships. 
 
A second stage of analysis searched for keywords denoting parental roles: mother, father, parenting, family, 
maternal, paternal, to quantify their relative frequencies and to identify segments of text where parents were 
discussed. These segments were then read and coded for meaning, with a particular focus on the theme 
of µdeterminism¶ µParents¶ were mentioned multiple times (1879 references) in almost all the documents, 
however, µfamily¶ was mentioned far less (696 references). µParenting¶ was mentioned in over half the 
sample, but µmothers¶ (223 references) were given far greater prominence than µfathers¶ (87 references). 
Concern with mothers was further indicated by mentions of µmaternal¶ (87 references) being much higher 
than mentions of µpaternal¶ (5 references).  
 
Analysis 
In many of the documents, there were strong echoes of typical first three years movement claims-making, 
in particular, the invocation of scientific authority. We will focus first on the way in which the some of the 
sample dramatised and scientised infant determinism. Secondly, we will discuss how infant determinism 
segues into parental determinism in heavily gendered, but largely unacknowledged, ways. Thirdly, we note 
that there was a higher than usual degree of contestation over ACE claims in a way that is less typical of 
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existing first three years discourse. Finally, we consider what becomes of the parent in ACEs claims-
making. 
 
Dramatising and scientising infant and parental determinism 
The degree of certainty about, or perhaps faith in, µthe science¶ of infant determinism as an established fact 
was a marked feature of some of the contributions, for example in the submission from Penelope Leach, 
the child psychologist and author of a number of influential guides to parenting: 
 
...there remains no scope for argument. It is a fact that the emotional environment of infancy, 
consisting almost entirely of relationships with the parents or their surrogates, shapes the individual 
emotionally, psychologically and neurologically, for good or for ill, forever«4 
 
The submission from the Big Lottery, a µnon-departmental public body¶ which straddles the space between 
government and the third sector, distributing the proceeds of the national lottery, set out claims to ACEs 
µtruth¶ in similarly definitive terms: 
 
ACEs are leading determinants of all mental illnesses, many pervasive societal problems and the 
ten leading causes of death in the Western world (including cancer, diabetes, and strokes).5 
 
Infant determinism is rarely separable from parental determinism: it is the parent-child relationship which is 
understood to define not only the infant but the future adult. An individual submission from a health visitor 
expressed in particularly poetic terms the typically biologised claims of parental determinism.  
 
T.S.Elliott wrote 'In my beginning is my end'...This speaks an important truth. An individual¶s 
experience as a baby will shape and influence their life. It will influence their relationships, their 
physical and mental health and their ability to learn and fulfil their potential. Long term stress in 
pregnancy can have a profound effect on both the mother and her foetus. Cortisol released as a 
result of this will affect the foetal brain...If the baby experiences loving consistent care, the child's 
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brain will be 'wired up' in a different way to the infant who experiences neglect, domestic abuse in 
the home.6 
 
Such highly dramatised assertions locate the source of µthe problem¶ in parental, usually maternal, 
behaviour and emotions. The family home and the maternal body are talked of as posing an imminent threat 
to infant bodies and minds.  
Gendered harms 
As noted earlier, there was far greater interest in, or concern for, mothers than fathers. With mothers, there 
was a powerful emphasis on pregnancy, attachment, depression and stress, positioning the mother, her 
emotions and her body as the primary determinates of normal or abnormal infant development. In a number 
of documents, references were made to mothers as the µuterine environment¶, with the behaviour of the 
mother directly transmitting harm to the fetus, whether through taking in µtoxins¶ such as drugs and alcohol 
or through emitting µtoxic stress¶ from her emotional state. 
 
Consistently stressful experiences are likely to have a negative influence on all aspects of 
development. This, as mentioned, is especially true for in utero experiences, when the mother is 
stressed during pregnancy...7 
 
Although some contributions were concerned with the suffering of women themselves, in the vast majority 
of references to mothers¶ mental health, the consequences for the child were emphasised, indicating that 
the mother¶s body and mind are of secondary concern, instrumentalised in the task of creating emotionally 
functional children.  
 
The work of the sociologist Sharon Hays and others who have subsequently worked with her 
conceptualisation of µthe cultural contradictions of motherhood¶, suggests that the intensification of 
demands on mothers, expressed most strongly in the re-biologisation of their role, emerges as an attempt 
to deal with the uncertainty thrown up by the reconstitution of womanhood during the late twentieth century 
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(Hays, 1996; Faircloth, 2013). This insecurity does seem borne out in the concern for µattachments¶, which 
can be read as expressing an anxiety about the continued existence of maternal love. Whereas the origins 
of attachment theory lie in attempts to make the case against maternal absence during the early years of 
life, the quality of maternal presence seems to be the object of concern in our sample (see Kanieski, 2010). 
The depressed mother is constructed as physically present but emotionally absent; a parent who requires 
sensitising to her child, indeed, to her role as mother. Otherwise, poor attachment becomes µpsychologically 
and neurologically encoded¶, forming µwhat could be the basis of lifelong expectations of the world and of 
the self¶.8 
 
The quote below from The WAVE Trust makes a forceful claim for the mother¶s emotional state µdamaging¶ 
their child¶s brain, but the father is also implicitly introduced as a contributory factor, here constructed as a 
violent figure causing stress during pregnancy. 
 
...permanent damage can be done to children¶s brains by the mother experiencing stress or anxiety 
during pregnancy. There is also strong evidence that pregnancy can be a peak period for domestic 
violence, and that it often begins during pregnancy.9 
 
References to fathers were concentrated in a quarter of the documents, with no mentions at all in the 
majority. Where fathers were mentioned, it was often their absence rather than their presence which was 
the source of concern: µnot having a father in the house remains the number one predictor of teenage 
mental health problems in the UK¶10 The theme of male violence runs through many documents, but some 
parenting programmes emphasised the need for men to be cultivated as µinvolved¶ or µengaged¶ fathers 
despite violence between the couple. Expectations of fathers were significantly less demanding than those 
of mothers and were not biologised, other than where they were a cause of µtoxic stress¶ through violent 
behaviour, but even here, the mother tends to be positioned as the vector for the paternal threat: 
 
...a mother who has suffered significant domestic abuse from the baby¶s father, sees the father in 




Whereas the influence of mothers is constructed as a very direct, totalising, biologised effect on the child¶s 
physical and mental development, the father is attributed a much more muted role, usually mediated by the 
mother. 
 
Querying µthe science¶ 
In a number of documents, considerable caution was expressed concerning the current state of knowledge 
about µthe science of ACEs¶. Such contestation over early years claims-making is relatively unusual in the 
context of the usual discourse of the first three years movement. In a highly critical submission, the 
sociologist Professor Hilary Rose and neuroscientist Professor Steven Rose challenged simplistic claims 
that measuring µcortisol¶ levels has established that µstress¶ is the mechanism by which negative maternal 
emotions are transmitted to the child (µstress¶ was mentioned 387 times in 70 documents): 
 
The EI literature tends to ignore such complexities...instead asserting that high cortisol levels are 
indicative that an infant has been subject to µtoxic¶ stress as a result of an unsupportive 
environment, even referring to it as µcorrosive cortisol¶. Neither neuroscience nor endocrinology 
could accept such a simplistic designation.12  
 
While a few other submissions were critical of ACEs on the grounds that claims to certainty are premature 
rather fundamentally unscientific, some cautioned against the misapplication of population-level data as 
containing insights into phenomenon at the individual level, in particular regarding the use of an µACE score¶ 
to describe individuals. Academic researchers involved in longitudinal studies also pointed to the problems 
with the µACE score¶ 
 
The ACE score approach is highly limited in being able to inform interventions as it¶s unclear which 
adversities produce the most negative impacts upon health and how this occurs. The limitations of 




And Professor of Epidemiology and Public Health Christine Power similarly queried the extent of knowledge 
about the effect of particular ACEs:  
 
Evidence is scarce for ACEs separately, particularly for childhood neglect, and for associated child 
developmental trajectories likely to affect later outcomes.14 
 
These contestations were emphasised in the Inquiry¶s final report and recommendations.15 Some of the 
professional associations were also wary of the claims to certainty about µthe science¶ of ACEs. The 
Association of Directors of Public Health wrote: 
 
There is also limited research examining the magnitude of the impact in those at the lower end of 
the spectrum, who have experienced a small number of ACEs (less than four). Other potential gaps 
in the evidence also include research establishing causality; it is important to distinguish association 
from cause and effect.16 
 
While the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health suggested that there is µlittle robust research¶ to 
µclaim there is a sufficient evidence-base for specific interventions¶17 Existing critiques of the first three 
years movement have noted that doubts or criticisms about µthe science¶ do not necessarily dent the 
confidence of its advocates (Macvarish, 2016), but the claims put forward by this latest iteration of early 
years advocacy do seem to have provoked greater criticism than earlier phases. Why this is would merit 
further investigation. 
 
The paradox of parental determinism 
In the oral sessions of the Inquiry, during which some contributors of written submissions (including our 
group of co-authors) were invited to give evidence to the committee, Professor Edward Melhuish, a 
psychologist whose work has been influential in UK early years policy since the mid-1990s, made an 
argument for inculcating a belief in µparental determinism¶ more widely in the general population as a way 




There is an ignorance among people in general about the importance of what they do for children¶s 
lives. Children¶s everyday experiences shape their lives, yet among many people there is a kind of 
fatalism. They think, ³The child will be what it is going to be like anyway. It does not really matter 
what I do.´ When you have that kind of attitude, you do not try to help your child. To overcome that 
kind of philosophy, we need to change our culture with regard to how we view parenting.18  
 
Here we can see that the articulation of parental determinism can sound like a rallying cry for the exercise 
of greater parental agency. However, the ACEs proposition contains within it a central tension for policy-
makers: the parent is both the cause of the problem and the solution to it. Where the parent is µemotionally 
available¶, they serve as a protective mediator between the child, material circumstances or other adverse 
factors: a parent who loves in an appropriate way can offset the harm that would otherwise be caused by a 
suboptimal environment. But most ACEs are directly attributed to parental behaviour, or, where the 
problematic behaviour is that of one parent and not another, the µgood¶ parent who fails to effect a positive 
mediation in a harm-reducing direction, then becomes a cause of harm.  How can the parent be appealed 
to as the agent of change when they are identified so relentlessly as the cause of the problem? Secondly, 
how can problems which are believed have become embedded in the brain during pregnancy and infancy 
possibly be remedied? 
 
Descriptions of what parents must do in order to act as mediators against the effect of ACEs are various: 
sometimes the need to inculcate µattachment¶ in the parent-child relationship is emphasised19 or, as noted 
above, ACE-preventive parenting is said to require the avoidance of µstress¶, often referred to as µtoxic 
stress¶ Parents must work, with professionals, on their own ACEs, to reduce their stress, µbreak(ing) the 
cycle once and for all¶.20  Much has been written on the move from political understandings of inequality 
and social class to the re-emergence of biologised theories of µcycles¶ (Welshman, 2008). We do not have 
space to explore the particular invocation of intergenerational transmission of disadvantage in ACEs 
discourse, but it is a significant feature of the phenomenon and further demonstrates that early intervention 




Elsewhere in the sample, there seemed to be evidence that some ACEs advocates have become sensitive 
to criticisms that the first three years movement risks promulgating negative parent-blaming and pessimistic 
determinism. One submission argued: 
 
There is...concern that a high ACE score could be seen as a pre-determined predictor of long term 
failure, and this is simply not true...21  
 
But it goes on: 
...in order to address the long term effects of ACEs and to stop a high ACE score become a self-
fulfilling prophecy, we need to be building confidence, knowledge and understanding of 
professionals in their roles as µstable, caring, adults¶ to support resilience building for/with the 
children in their care, or to support parents to become µstable, caring, adults¶ 
 
Here, the professional is explicitly positioned as the key µstable, caring adult¶ not only for the child but also 
for the parent, in order to reconstruct them, in turn, as  µstable, caring adults¶ In the oral sessions, George 
Hosking of The Wave Trust, a central figure in the UK advocacy, was also keen to counter accusations of 
fatalism:   
...research shows that not everybody who has ACEs ends up becoming a violent criminal or having 
other negative impacts.22  
 
Hosking went on to explain that the determining effects of ACEs can be mediated by relationships: 
 
If you look at and understand what makes the essential distinction, it is whether that person has 
experienced warmth, love and understanding, usually from a consistently available adult during 
their life. That could be another family member; it could be a school teacher; it could be a youth 
worker; it could be almost anybody, but when that is provided in somebody¶s life it makes a 




Hosking is no doubt correct in his view that adults, and not just parents, can have a protective effect on a 
child, but it is noteworthy that the parent has now disappeared, to be replaced by other adults, with a 
flattening out of distinctions between family members and state professionals.  
 
In the ACEs discussion we can see that parents fade in and out of the picture. Sometimes, they are the 
absent or shadowy sources of ACEs, their embedded emotional dysfunctions transmitted via stress, 
violence or µinsecure attachment¶ to the bodies and minds of their children. At other times, parents are 
brought to the fore as protectors against the effect of ACEs, but only if provided with the right professional 
support. Generally, they are more likely to be constructed as potential vectors of biologised harm in need 
of neutralisation than sources of love, care or authority. In the case of mothers, there seems to be little faith 
in any maternal µinstinct¶ or spontaneous feelings of love, rather, motherhood is portayed as more likely to 
inspire depression, or re-trigger past traumas. This is almost a mirror image of the historic idealisations of 
naturalised motherhood upon which early versions of infant determinism were founded. 
 
This instability in the status of the parent and, indeed, of adulthood, produces a fundamental tensions in 
the policy domain. In ACEs discourse, the infant determinism of the first three years is read simultaneously 
forwards into the future of the  developing child and backwards into the past of the damaged parent. Indeed, 
some advocates encourage professionals to engage in µroutine enquiry¶ with all service-users regarding 
possible ACEs in their pasts; as the slogan goes, µGRQ¶t ask, ³what¶s wrong with you?´, ask, ³what happened 
to you´¶. While this seems to be a well-meaning attempt to reconstitute the citizen in need of social support 
less as a problem or a threat and more as a deserving victim of their past; imagining them as the vulnerable 
child they once were, it also positions professionals as the only µadults in the room¶. The problem this poses 
for the socialisation of children is that while the task requires a multitude of adults, at its heart it is founded 
on the spontaneous assumption of responsibility by adults with a unique connection to the particular child. 





By politicising the earliest years of infancy, the first three years movement facilitated a reconstitution of the 
relationship between the state and the citizen (as parent). But in making its case for more direct state 
intervention in family relationships, it has tended to generalise problems, denigrate parents and reduce the 
moral and social significance of family life to instrumentalised, µscientised¶ meanings. ACEs have continued 
this project but seem to be producing greater contestation amongst professionals and a bolder reaction 
from some parents who object to being constructed as vectors of harm. How the state can support families 
without undermining the authority of parents is the key question for family policy today. However, this is 
rarely addressed directly as the approach which has dominated the policy domain for the past 30 years has 
tended to undermine a belief in the capacity of adults to function spontaneously in a competent, 
autonomous way and to render complex human relationships and social structures in technocratic, pseudo-
scientised terms. We hope that the social science critique can play a role in re-opening the terrain of the 
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